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By Olivier Armantier, Charles A. Holt, and Charles R. Plott*
The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to remove “toxic” 
assets from portfolios of financially stressed banks. The Treasury 
selected a design whereby bids to sell different securities would 
be normalized by “reference prices” that reflect relative value 
estimates. We conduct a series of experiments indicating that a simple 
Reference Price Auction can be an effective mechanism for avoiding 
serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation, 
even with inaccurate reference prices. Beyond the TARP auction, 
our results are relevant to various multi-object auctions with value 
heterogeneity. (JEL D44, D82, G21)
In the fall of 2008, as the financial crisis reached a critical stage, the US Treasury was setting up a series of auctions to purchase potentially thousands of highly 
heterogeneous mortgage-backed securities (MBS) from financial institutions as part 
of the TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program). With a budget of up to $700 bil-
lion, this would have been the largest auction in history, surpassing even the larg-
est spectrum auctions by a factor of ten (Binmore and Klemperer 2002). Since no 
appropriate “off-the-shelf ” design existed for this purpose, a new auction format 
had to be rapidly developed. The scale of the proposed auction and the immediacy of 
the crisis generated considerable discussion among economists (e.g., Varian 2008; 
Brusco 2008; Ausubel and Cramton 2008).1 After consulting with academic experts, 
1 Numerous economists also questioned the appropriateness of purchasing illiquid MBS. See, e.g., the open let-
ter signed by more than 100 economists sent to Congress on September 24, 2008 (http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/
john.cochrane/research/Papers/mortgage_protest.htm).
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the Treasury selected a new design, a “Reference Price” auction. It was unclear, 
however, how this design would perform. In this paper, we report on an experiment 
aimed at testing different features of the Reference Price Auction adopted by the 
Treasury. Beyond the TARP, the lessons learned in this exercise apply to a broad set 
of similar multi-object auctions.
The Reference Price design the Treasury selected is a version of what is known 
in the literature as a “scoring auction,” in which bids with heterogeneous character-
istics are homogenized through the use of a score that incorporates both price and 
nonprice dimensions of the bids (e.g., quality).2 As further explained in Section I, 
the nonprice dimension for the TARP auction was to be based on “reference price” 
estimates of the relative values of the MBS (Swagel 2009). It was believed that the 
main benefit of this design is that it could promote competition and provide some 
protection against adverse selection. In addition, although undoubtedly suboptimal 
in the formal mechanism design sense, it was deemed simple, transparent, and robust 
enough to be implemented rapidly and effectively to purchase thousands of different 
securities. The Treasury team in charge of designing the auction, however, realized 
that the performance of the design may rely heavily on its ability to precisely esti-
mate reference prices. As such, an exercise could not be conducted without mak-
ing mistakes, and concerns were expressed about the possibility that bidders could 
exploit these mistakes at the Treasury’s expense. Several remedies were proposed to 
mitigate this problem. In particular, it was suggested that the Treasury would only 
reveal reference prices after the auction, so that the bidders would not be able to 
observe the Treasury’s valuation errors at the time bids are submitted.
Given the complexity of the environment and the time constraints, it appeared 
difficult to address the relevant issues directly with economic theory. A commonly 
used procedure in such situations is to conduct laboratory experiments that simulate 
the environment with financially motivated human subjects.3 The objective of the 
experiment conducted in this paper is threefold. First, we want to test whether a 
Reference Price Auction with accurate reference prices performs better (from the 
buyer’s perspective) than a Grand Auction in which all securities are pooled together 
in a single reverse auction and purchased at a single price irrespective of the security 
accepted. Second, we want to explore how sensitive the Reference Price Auction 
is to reference prices that are incorrectly set by the buyer. More specifically, we 
want to test whether announcing noisy (instead of accurate) reference prices before 
the auction generates inefficiencies, as bidders can exploit mistakes made by the 
buyer. Third, we want to test one of the measures proposed to protect the Treasury 
against setting incorrect reference prices. Namely, we test whether the Reference 
Price Auction performs better for the buyer when the noisy reference prices are kept 
secret at the time of bidding.
Although this study was motivated by the TARP auction, our results are relevant 
more broadly to similar multi-object auctions. In addition to the scoring  auctions 
2 See Armantier, Florens, and Richard (1998); Armantier (1999); Stoneham et al. (2002); Cason, Gangadharan, 
and Duke (2003); or Asker and Cantillon (2008) for other forms of scoring auctions.
3 See Plott (2001) and Holt, Shobe, and Smith (2007) for surveys on the use of laboratory experiments to guide pub-
lic policy initiatives, including auctions. For specific examples of auction designs that have been tested in the lab before 
being implemented in the field, see Holt et al. (2008); Goeree and Holt (2010); or Cummings, Holt, and Laury (2004).
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discussed in the papers mentioned in footnote 2, there are several examples within 
the realm of finance in which various items with heterogeneous characteristics are 
auctioned simultaneously. This is the case when a financial institution attempts 
to raise a certain amount of liquidity by auctioning the various assets of a fail-
ing institution, or a large portfolio of mortgage-backed securities with different 
characteristics (e.g., rating, vintage).4 Another important example is the case of 
Open Market Operations in which a central bank decides to purchase for a fixed 
dollar amount of various securities from a set of eligible sellers. The challenge 
for a central bank is to compare the prices submitted for different securities in 
order to decide which bids to accept. In the United States, the Federal Reserve 
addresses this challenge with a variant of the Reference Price Auction described 
in this paper.5
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The Reference Price Auction 
is explained in Section I. Section II details the experimental procedures used to 
compare parallel series of laboratory test auctions. Section III summarizes the main 
results of these experiments in terms of purchase efficiency (defined as the value 
of securities purchased relative to total expenditure) and price discovery (auction 
clearing prices relative to unobserved security values). In Section IV, we conduct 
an econometric analysis to better understand differences in bidding behavior and 
auction outcomes.
I. The Reference Price Auction
In this section, we present the basic principles underlying the Reference Price 
Auction. To convey the intuition behind these principles and to contrast the 
Reference Price Auction with the Grand Auction, we consider a simple example 
with two bidders and two securities. Bidder 1 owns one unit of security A, while 
bidder 2 owns two units of security B. As indicated in Table 1, the low quality 
security A has a value of 5, while the high quality security B has a value of ten. To 
simplify, we assume that the values of the two securities are known to the bidders 
but not to the auctioneer. The bidders therefore compete in a complete information 
environment. Consistent with the design adopted by the Treasury for the TARP 
program, we consider a reverse auction with sealed bids, and with a uniform price 
mechanism (i.e., the lowest bids win and are paid the lowest rejected bid).6 For 
each unit they own, participants can submit a bid price. Bids are constrained to 
be integers and ties are decided at random. Finally, the government budget is 
assumed to be 18.
Consider first the Grand Auction in the top panel of Table 1. As explained below, 
this is a special case of Reference Price Auction in which all reference prices are set 
to one. It is easy to verify that value bidding is an equilibrium in this Grand Auction. 
4 These two cases correspond to single-seller auctions, not procurement auctions like the TARP. From a theoretic 
perspective, however, the two mechanisms may be considered equivalent.
5 Additional examples include the cash auctions conducted by the Bank of England (Klemperer 2010), and 
two-sided markets for bonds where preset reference prices are used to homogenize bonds of different maturities 
(Hasbrouck 2007).
6 See the supplemental materials for a discussion of the design choices for the TARP auction.
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Thus, the auctioneer accepts bidder 1’s offer on the low quality security (with a check 
mark in column 3) and pays a clearing price equal to ten, the value of the high quality 
security (as indicated by an asterisk in the normalized bid row). With a budget of 18, 
the auctioneer cannot afford a unit of security B since it would cost an additional ten. 
Bidder 1 then makes a profit of 5, while the  auctioneer’s  purchase efficiency, defined 
as the value of all the securities purchased relative to the auctioneer’s total expendi-
ture, is equal to 1/2 (see the last column of Table 1).7 The Grand Auction therefore 
exhibits severe adverse selection since the auctioneer purchases the low quality secu-
rity A (which is not a problem per se), but overpays considerably by spending an 
amount equal to the value of the high quality security B.8
Consider now the Reference Price Auction. One of the basic principles underly-
ing this design is that the auctioneer sets “reference prices” so as to reflect estimates 
of the values of the various securities relative to a baseline security.9 Let us con-
sider first the case where the auctioneer accurately assesses these relative values 
and announces them before the auction. In that case, security B would be assigned 
a reference price of 2 in our example since it is twice as valuable as the baseline 
security A (see the middle panel of Table 1). Each bid is then normalized by divid-
ing the unit price bid by the reference price corresponding to that security. As a 
result, the bids for different securities are homogenized and can be compared. In the 
example in Table 1 for instance, the bids on security B are divided by their refer-
ence price of two in order to make them comparable to bids on the baseline security. 
The normalization process therefore lowers (respectively, raises) the price bid for 
securities with higher values (respectively, lower values).
7 It is also an equilibrium for bidder 2 to submit a per-unit bid anywhere between 10 and 18, in which case 
the auctioneer would spend more than 10 for the unit of security A. Therefore, purchase efficiency in this Grand 
Auction can be anywhere between 5/18 (or about 0.28) and 1/2.
8 A security-by-security auction would effectively deal with the unobserved value heterogeneity. As discussed in 
the supplemental materials, this approach was considered impractical and undesirable for the TARP.
9 For the TARP, these reference prices would have been calculated by combining the latest transactions data, 
other market information (e.g., Markit ABX index, the subprime residential MBS credit derivative), valuation mod-
els, expert opinions, and prices from previous TARP auctions.
Table 1—Example under Complete Information 
(Value of security A = 5, value of security B = 10, government budget = 18)
Bidder 1 Bidder 2
Security
purchased
Price
paid
Value 
purchased
Purchase 
efficiency†
Security A Security B Security B
V = 5 V = 10 V = 10
Grand Auction
(reference prices: 1 for A and 1 for B)
Bid 5✓ 10 10 A 10 5 1/2
Normalized bid 5 10* 10*
Bidder’s profit 5 0
Known accurate 
reference price
(reference prices: 1 for A and 2 for B)
Bid 5✓ 12✓ 12 A and B 6+12 5+10 5/6
Normalized bid 5 6 6*
Bidder’s profit 1 2
Known overpriced
reference price
(reference prices: 1 for A and 3 for B)
Bid 5 15 12✓ B 15 10 2/3
Normalized bid 5* 5* 4
Bidder’s profit 0 5
† Purchase efficiency is the ratio of the value purchased to the government expenditure.
* Indicates the lowest rejected bid.
✓ Indicates a bid accepted by the auctioneer.
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The bids with the lowest normalized bids are accepted first, moving up the list 
until the auctioneer’s budget is exhausted. Under a uniform price auction, all winning 
bidders for a given security would receive the same price per unit. To determine this 
price, the “market clearing normalized price” (i.e., the lowest rejected  normalized 
price bid) must first be calculated. This common cutoff normalized price, multiplied 
by the corresponding reference price, determines the “market clearing price” per 
unit for a given security.
To illustrate, consider our example with accurate reference prices in the middle 
panel of Table 1. It is easy to verify that by bidding above value, bidder 2 can man-
age to sell one unit of security B in equilibrium. As indicated in Table 1, bids of 12 
per-unit by bidder 2 produce normalized bids of 6, in which case the market clearing 
normalized price is also 6. The auctioneer then exhausts its budget by purchasing one 
unit of each security, paying 6 for security A (since the reference price for security A 
is one) and 12 for security B (since the reference price for security B is 2). Because 
the value purchased is 15, the auctioneer purchase efficiency is 5/6, slightly lower 
than 1 but substantially better than in the Grand Auction. As this example illustrates, 
although the Reference Price Auction does not necessarily eliminate adverse selec-
tion, it can help mitigate the problem.
A possible limitation with this basic Reference Price design is that its effective-
ness may crucially rely on the ability of the auctioneer to come up with reference 
prices that reflect the relative security values. In particular, bidders might be able to 
exploit mispriced reference prices. To illustrate this possibility, consider the example 
in Table 1 and imagine that the auctioneer “overprices” security B by setting its ref-
erence price at three instead of two (its actual relative value). The bidder who owns 
security B then possesses an advantage compared to the owner of the correctly priced 
security A. Indeed, all else equal, the normalized bid on security B will be lower (as 
it is incorrectly scored against a higher reference price), which makes it more likely 
to be accepted in the auction. As a result, bidders may find it advantageous to exploit 
overpriced reference prices by submitting higher bids on those securities.
In our example, bidder 2 can take advantage of the fact that security B is over-
priced to make sure he sells one unit of security B at a high price. As shown in 
the bottom panel of Table 1, if bidder 2 increases his bid to 15 on the first unit of 
 security B and keeps his bid at 12 on the second unit, then the market clearing nor-
malized price is 5. In that case, the auctioneer can only purchase the second unit of 
security B (with a normalized bid of 4 = 12/3) at a price of 15 = 3 × 5. As shown 
in Table 1, bidder 2 now makes a profit of five and the auctioneer’s purchase effi-
ciency drops to 2/3 compared to 5/6 when reference prices are accurate.
It is interesting to point out some of the differences with the Grand Auction in 
this example. In particular, the auctioneer in the Grand Auction purchases the low-
est quality security and overpays because of its inability to discriminate between 
the values of securities A and B. In the Reference Price Auction, with overpriced 
reference prices, the auctioneer also overpays but purchases a unit of the high quality 
security. The latter result is not due to the standard form of adverse selection as in the 
Grand Auction. Instead, it is driven by the errors made by the auctioneer when setting 
the reference prices. In our example, note also that the purchase efficiency is higher 
in the Reference Price auction with inaccurate reference prices than in the Grand 
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Auction. Intuitively, this result should depend on the relative strength of two effects: 
the extent of adverse selection in the Grand Auction versus the extent of mispricing 
in the Reference Price Auction. Finally, observe that the Grand Auction is a special 
case of the Reference Price Auction in which all the reference prices are incorrectly 
set to one. In our Grand Auction example in the top panel of Table 1, security B (with 
a relative value of two) is therefore underpriced. Because of this relative advantage, 
security A is purchased by the auctioneer at a price that exceeds its value.
Several measures were proposed to mitigate the problem of incorrect reference 
prices. In particular, it was suggested that keeping reference prices secret at the 
time of the auction would prevent the bidders from exploiting mispriced securities. 
To illustrate, consider the example in Table 1 and imagine the auctioneer does not 
reveal ex ante the reference price for security B. Assume also that, consistent with 
the previous examples, the auctioneer’s reference price for security B can be either 
(i) inaccurate and underpriced (i.e., equal to one) with probability 1/4, (ii) accu-
rate (i.e., equal to two) with probability 1/2, or (iii) inaccurate and overpriced (i.e., 
equal to 3) with probability 1/4. In that case, it can be verified that it is an equilib-
rium for bidder 1 to bid 5 on security A and for bidder 2 to bid 12 on each unit of 
security B.10 In that case, the auctioneer’s expected purchase efficiency is 35/48 (or 
about 0.73), which is higher than 1/2 and 2/3, the purchase efficiencies when it is 
known before the auction that security B is respectively underpriced and overpriced 
(see the top and bottom panels of Table 1). Thus, in this example, keeping reference 
prices secret provides some protection to the auctioneer against mispriced reference 
prices.11 However, one should question whether the results from a simple complete 
information example extend to more general environments. To explore this issue, we 
report in the next section on an experiment conducted with real bidders and incom-
plete information.
II. Experimental Procedures
The experiment consists of four treatments. As explained below, these treatments 
essentially differ in two ways: the accuracy of the reference prices and whether 
the reference prices are announced before or after the auction. For each treatment, 
we conducted six sessions in which six subjects competed in eight successive auc-
tions. The sessions, which lasted about an hour and fifteen minutes, were conducted 
10 The expected profits of bidders 1 and 2 given this pair of strategies are 9/4 and 6/4, respectively. Since bidder 
1 systematically bids five in equilibrium whether or not the reference prices are accurate (see the three panels in 
Table 1), it is easy to verify that he has no incentives to deviate. Likewise, if bidder 2 deviates and increases the bid 
on the first unit to 15 (as in the lower panel of Table 1), then his expected profits drop to 5/4.
11 Revealing reference prices only after the auction raises a commitment concern since the auctioneer may 
have an incentive to revise its reference prices based on the information contained in the bids submitted. In fact, 
one aspect of the proposal by Goeree and Holt (2008) for the TARP involved endogenized reference prices, i.e., 
modified ex-post as a result of the bids submitted. An additional feature suggested by Plott (2008) to help banks fill 
possible needs for liquidity targets was to allow bidders to submit a small number of “conditional package bids,” 
i.e., a bundle of individual bids, accompanied with the condition “if one bid in the package is accepted, then all other 
bids in the package are cancelled.”
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with undergraduate students in the Veconlab at the University of Virginia and at the 
CIRANO’s Bell Laboratory for Experimental Economics in Montréal.12
Each auction involved six securities, labeled A through F. Each security was 
divided in ten shares, and each bidder was endowed with five shares of one security, 
three of a second, and two of a third. The ownership pattern was balanced in the sense 
that each security was distributed across three subjects who owned five, three, and 
two shares, respectively. This ownership concentration was intended to provide more 
opportunities for strategic bidding and more of a stress test of the auction designs.
Given the complex nature of the environment and the relatively unfamiliar pro-
curement (low bids win) auction format, we decided to include some context, with-
out being too specific.13 For example, the items being purchased were referred to as 
“shares” of “securities” instead of “mortgage-backed securities,” and the buyer was 
referred to as the “government” instead of the “Treasury.” This terminology will be 
used in the discussion of the experimental results.
As explained in the previous section, we consider the sealed bid, uniform-price 
auction with reference prices the Treasury was considering to implement. Prior to 
each auction, each of the securities was assigned a common value that was ran-
domly drawn from a uniform distribution on a range [20, 80]. Each subject received 
three private signals, one for each security she/he owned, each independently drawn 
from a uniform distribution centered at the true security value, with a range of plus 
or minus ten. Since the true values were between 20 and 80, the possible signals 
spanned the range from 10 to 90.14 Bidders were told to think of these numbers as 
“dollars per hundred of par value.” In some of the treatments, the government also 
received noisy signals about the securities’ values through random numbers drawn 
from a uniform distribution with a range of plus or minus 20 from the true value of 
the security. Thus the government received lower quality information than the bid-
ders, as its signals were twice as noisy.
Note, also, that we used matching sets of random draws for each treatment (akin 
to a common random number technique), i.e., each treatment was conducted with 
the same series of six random number seed values (one per session). Therefore, all 
sets of random draws (for the security values, the bidders’ value signals and, when 
relevant, the government’s value signals) were the same across treatments for each 
of the 48 auctions in a treatment. As a result, the experimental outcomes obtained in 
each treatment may be compared directly.
12 It is common to conduct lab experiments with students to test the properties of new mechanisms (see the 
examples in footnote 3). Such “wind tunnel” experiments have proved very informative about the actual behavior 
of professionals when the mechanism is ultimately implemented in the field. Note also that the Veconlab Reverse 
Auction program used for the experiment is listed under the Auctions menu at http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/
admin.php. A copy of the instructions is provided in the supplemental materials.
13 We recognize that there are pros and cons in introducing some context when describing the experiment 
to the subjects. Note, however, that the terminology used was the same across treatments. Moreover, we did not 
observe any obvious differences in behavior in the sessions conducted in the United States (Virginia) and in Canada 
(Montréal), where no bailout took place.
14 A feature of this type of common value auction is that extreme signals are more informative. In particular, 
signals below 30 and above 70 restrict the range of possible true values. In our experiment, 21 percent of the signals 
are below 30 or above 70. As explained later on, the same signals were used in all treatments, so that the comparison 
across treatments is valid.
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The government purchase budget was set at 2,000 (experiment dollars), corre-
sponding to two-thirds of the expected value of the 60 shares for sale at an auction 
(3,000). This ratio is relatively high compared to what the Treasury was actually 
considering for the TARP auction (i.e., no more than 50 percent of the total value of 
the securities included in the auction). We chose such a high budget to help subjects 
earn money by selling at high prices.
Bidders could submit “supply functions,” i.e., they could enter a bid price for each 
share of each security they own. At the time subjects submit their bids, the follow-
ing information is common knowledge: (i) the government purchase budget, (ii) the 
distribution of security endowments across bidders, (iii) the distribution from which 
the security values are randomly drawn, (iv) the conditional distributions of the bid-
ders’ signals, and (v) in the relevant treatments, the conditional distributions of the 
government’s signals.
For each accepted bid, the bidder earns the difference between the price received 
from the government and the true value of the security. Otherwise, earnings are zero. 
It follows that each auction is a zero-sum game, so government losses are equal to 
the bidders’ profits.15 The cash payout rate was $0.05 per experiment dollar, and they 
were generally in the $13–$30 range, with an average of $23.
The four treatments are summarized in Table 2. These treatments were designed 
to address the most important concerns raised by the Treasury team: How much of 
an improvement would a Reference Price Auction be compared to a Grand Auction? 
How sensitive is a Reference Price Auction to noisy reference prices? Does pur-
chase efficiency improve when noisy reference prices are kept secret?
Treatment 1: Grand Auction.—Bids for all securities are collected, ranked and 
the government purchases the securities with the lowest price until its budget is 
exhausted. The price of the lowest rejected bid determines the market clearing price. 
A bidder is paid the market clearing price for each share of a security accepted by 
the government. This implies that all securities are purchased by the government at 
the same price regardless of type.
The main object of this treatment is to serve as a lower benchmark against which 
the treatments involving reference prices will be compared. Indeed, as discussed 
in Section I, this simple combined auction should yield low purchase efficiency 
because of adverse selection.
Treatment 2: Announced Accurate Reference Price Auction.—This treatment 
is the same as Treatment 1, except that the government divides bids for a security 
by a reference price announced to bidders before the auction. Each reference 
price in this treatment is perfectly accurate, i.e., equal to the ratio of a security’s 
value to the value of the baseline security A. As explained in the previous section, 
the government purchases the securities with the lowest normalized prices. The 
normalized price of the lowest rejected bid gives the normalized market clearing 
15 In practice, this may not have been the case for the TARP auction. Indeed, some have argued that the securities 
were worth less to the bidders than to the government because (i) the government may have been a more patient 
investor, or (ii) some bidders faced a need for immediate liquidity.
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price, which is determined recursively so as to exhaust the auction budget. The 
actual price paid by the government for a security is then determined by multi-
plying the reference price for that security by the common normalized market 
clearing price.
In this ideal case where relative security values are precisely known by the gov-
ernment, the reference prices should create a level playing field by homogenizing 
the bids for securities of different values, and should therefore promote competition 
across bidders and securities. Again, we only consider this extreme scenario to pro-
vide an upper bound on purchase efficiency to which the other two treatments with 
noisy reference prices will be compared.
Treatment 3: Announced Noisy Reference Price Auction.—This treatment is the 
same as Treatment 2, except that the government now relies on noisy reference 
prices determined as ratios of the government’s noisy signal for each security to the 
government’s noisy signal for the base security A.
This treatment may be considered an extreme case of an auction with noisy refer-
ence prices for at least two reasons. First, because its signals are twice as noisy as 
the bidders’, the government’s information about the absolute value of each secu-
rity is quite poor. Second, the government’s information about the relative values 
of the securities is even poorer. Indeed, by taking the ratio of its noisy signals the 
government compounds its errors. As a result, the reference prices the government 
uses to decide which security to purchase may be highly inaccurate, or even close to 
meaningless in some cases. In our experiment, for instance, the reference price for 
one of the securities in one of the eight auctions was incorrectly set at one-ninth of 
its actual relative value.
As explained in Section I, bidders may be able to take advantage of “overpriced” 
reference prices when noisy reference prices are announced before the auction. 
Thus, compared to the previous treatment with accurate reference prices, one may 
expect the government to pay more to acquire the same value.
Treatment 4: Secret Noisy Reference Price Auction.—This treatment is the same 
as Treatment 3 except that the government does not announce its noisy reference 
prices before the auction. In other words, in each of the eight auctions, the govern-
ment receives the same set of signals and therefore sets the same noisy reference 
prices as in Treatment 3. Likewise, the allocation mechanism and the pricing rules 
are exactly the same as in Treatment 3. The only difference with Treatment 3 is that 
bidders must now form expectations about the reference prices the government will 
use to score their bids.
Table 2—Treatments and Associated Reference Price Structures
Treatment
Reference price
estimates
Reference price
information
Grand Auction (no reference prices) None Irrelevant
Announced accurate reference prices Accurate Announced
Announced noisy reference prices Noisy Announced
Secret noisy reference prices Noisy Secret
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By not announcing reference prices before the auction, the government should be 
protected against strategic reactions to overpriced reference prices, and hence, the 
purchase efficiency should be higher with secret noisy reference prices than with 
announced noisy reference prices.
III. Laboratory Results
Summary outcome measures are organized by treatment in Table 3. As is appar-
ent in row 1, the government nearly exhausts its $2,000 auction purchase budget in 
all treatments. Row 2 in Table 3 gives the total value of the securities purchased by 
the government (on average) in each auction. Observe that the government operates 
the auctions at a loss in our experiment since its expenditure (row 1) exceeds the 
total value of the securities purchased (row 2) for all four treatments. Since this is 
a zero-sum game, subjects earn positive profits in all treatments. This result is not 
surprising given the relatively high budget we set for the government to guarantee 
our subjects positive earnings.
The best way to appreciate differences across treatments is to consider the pur-
chase efficiency in row 3. The Grand Auction produced an efficiency ratio of 0.766, 
meaning that for every dollar spent, the government purchases only 76.6 cents in 
value. In contrast, the accurate announced Reference Prices Auction is almost fully 
efficient, with an efficiency percentage of nearly 94 percent. In other words, if the 
government has precise estimates of the securities’ relative values, then, as hypoth-
esized, a Reference Price Auction homogenizes the different securities and produces 
a nearly efficient outcome. The outcomes of both the Grand Auction and the accu-
rate announced Reference Price Auction are therefore consistent with our predic-
tions, as the two treatments constitute two opposite benchmarks.
As indicated in the last two columns of Table 3 (row 3), the two treatments with 
noisy reference prices produce intermediate results. More specifically, the purchase 
efficiency ratios are 0.876 and 0.854 when the reference prices are respectively 
announced or kept secret before the auction. This implies that a Reference Price 
Auction is superior to the Grand Auction even when the government has little infor-
mation about the relative values of the securities. Observe, however, that keeping 
the noisy reference prices secret at the time of the auction does not improve the 
Table 3—Auction Outcomes by Treatment 
Averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) are calculated over the eight auctions in each treatment
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Row
Grand Auction
no reference
prices
Accurate 
announced 
reference prices
Noisy 
announced 
reference prices
Noisy 
secret 
reference prices
1 Government 
expenditure
1,912.4
(103.6)
1,955.0
(48.0)
1,934.9
(38.8)
1,943.2
(52.8)
2 Value of securities 
purchased
1,465.1
(207.1)
1,830.2
(177.5)
1,694.2
(208.5)
1,659.5
(142.6)
3 Purchase
efficiency†
0.766
(0.106)
0.936
(0.087)
0.876
(0.102)
0.854
(0.068)
† Purchase efficiency is defined as the ratio of the value purchased to the government expenditure.
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auction efficiency, in contrast with our prediction. Below, we show that this result 
is not due to the fact that the auction with secret noisy reference prices underper-
formed. Instead, we find evidence that the auction with announced noisy reference 
prices performed beyond expectations because it created competitive incentives that 
offset incentives to exploit mispriced reference prices. To sum up, the Reference 
Price Auctions clearly dominate the Grand Auction even when reference prices are 
extremely noisy, but keeping reference prices secret before the auction does not 
increase purchase efficiency.
These differences between treatments also hold up on an auction-by-auction 
basis, as shown in Figure 1 where we plot the efficiency ratio averaged over the six 
sessions in each of the eight auctions conducted. (Please ignore the “ counterfactual” 
line, which will be explained below.) The Grand Auction is always the least  efficient, 
while the auction with accurate announced reference prices is systematically the 
most efficient. The two treatments with noisy reference prices produce intermediate 
and somewhat similar efficiency ratios. Another interesting feature of the figure is 
that the purchase efficiency measures are fairly flat, thereby showing no evidence 
of learning or strategic adjustments (except for a possible decline in performance 
across auctions in the Grand Auction, which will be evaluated below). In other 
words, the dominance of the Reference Price Auction in terms of efficiency is imme-
diate and does not require the bidders to familiarize themselves with the slightly 
more complex auction design.
Compared to the benchmark auction with accurate reference prices, the drop 
in efficiency in the two noisy reference price treatments may be the result of both 
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Figure 1. Purchase Efficiency by Auction
Note: Value purchased to expenditure ratio averaged over the six sessions.
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(i) incorrect reference prices, and (ii) bidders strategically adjusting their behav-
ior in response to mispriced reference prices. In an effort to disentangle these two 
effects, we conduct a counterfactual exercise. The question raised in this exercise 
is: What would the purchase efficiency be in Treatment 4 if the bids submitted had 
been scored against accurate instead of noisy reference prices? To address this 
question, we take the bids the subjects submitted in Treatment 4 and score them 
against accurate reference prices.16 As indicated in Figure 1, the purchase effi-
ciency ratios in the counterfactual exercise are systematically higher than those in 
the two noisy reference price treatments, and similar to those observed when ref-
erence prices are accurate and announced (Treatment 2). This result suggests that 
the lower purchase efficiency ratios in the two noisy reference price treatments 
may be attributed primarily to noisy reference prices, not to adverse selection (as 
in the Grand Auction), nor strategic bidding adjustments in the face of greater 
uncertainty about reference prices.
To test statistically for treatment effects, we compare the purchased efficiency 
averaged over the eight auctions conducted for the six sessions in each treatment. 
These statistics are independent (since subjects could participate in one session 
only) and directly comparable (since the six sessions in each treatment were con-
ducted with the same six random seed values). The session averages, arranged by 
seed, are shown in Table 4. For all six seed values, the average purchase efficiency 
ratios are lowest for the Grand Auction (row 1) and highest for the auction with 
accurate announced reference prices (row 4). These differences are significant at 
conventional levels, using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, as shown in the last column 
of the table. Finally, we find no significant difference between the two noisy refer-
ence prices treatments ( p = 0.24 for a 2-tailed test), despite the fact that the average 
efficiency ratios are higher for five out of six seeds when the noisy reference prices 
are announced (row 2) rather than kept secret (row 3).
16 The key assumption underlying the counterfactual exercise is that subjects in Treatment 4 would have behaved 
in the same way had the secret reference prices been accurate instead of noisy.
Table 4—Purchase Efficiency by Session 
Value purchased to expenditure ratios averaged over all eight auctions per session
Row
Treatment:
reference prices
Session purchase efficiency  
averages for seeds 1 to 6
Treatment 
average
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank testa
1 Grand Auction (none) 0.79, 0.81, 0.79, 0.77, 0.72, 0.74 0.766
2 Announced, noisy 0.85, 0.86, 0.89, 0.92, 0.90, 0.83 0.876 Z = −2.201
p-value = 0.028
3 Secret, noisy 0.84, 0.84, 0.87, 0.83, 0.87, 0.87 0.854 Z = 1.166
p-value = 0.244
4 Announced, accurate 0.91, 0.91, 0.97, 0.89, 0.99, 0.95 0.936 Z = −2.207
p-value = 0.027
a Each test compares the distribution of the six ratios in the corresponding row with the distribution of the six ratios 
in the row above.
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When purchase efficiency is measured in terms of the ratio of value pur-
chased to the government’s expenditure, the main results of this section can be 
summarized:
Purchase Efficiency Results.— Purchase efficiency in the experiment is lowest when 
reference prices are not used (the Grand Auction) and it is close to full value when ref-
erence prices are accurate measures of relative security values. Intermediate efficiency 
measures are observed when the government only possesses noisy reference prices, but 
these efficiency measures are not improved by keeping reference prices secret before 
the auction. The counterfactual exercise suggests that the lower efficiencies in the treat-
ments with noisy reference prices are mostly due to the highly inaccurate reference 
prices, rather than to bidder strategic responses to noisy reference prices.17
Having compared the different auction formats with respect to purchase effi-
ciency, we now consider the issue of price discovery, i.e., the extent to which the 
auction clearing prices for each security provide accurate information about their 
unobserved values. As shown in Figure 2, the median clearing price in each treat-
ment is slightly above the underlying security values, thereby reflecting the govern-
ment’s overpayment (or conversely, the subjects’ profits) in the auctions.
17 To test the robustness of the results in this section, we conducted additional treatments (reported as supple-
mental materials) using alternative earnings and reference price procedures. These robustness checks confirm the 
ranking of the four treatments with respect to purchase efficiency.
Figure 2. Distribution of the Difference between the Security Sale Price 
 and the Security Actual Value
Notes: The line inside a box characterizes the median, while the borders of the box characterize the 25th and 75th 
percentiles. The ends of the whiskers represent the 5th and 95th percentiles. Finally, the dots represent outliers.
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With respect to the distribution of auction clearing prices, we can see in Figure 2 
that the Grand Auction produces dispersed and essentially uninformative prices. In 
contrast, the auction clearing prices are tightly distributed when reference prices are 
accurate (Treatment 2). There are no obvious differences between the two treatments 
with noisy reference prices: they are both slightly better than the Grand Auction in 
terms of price discovery, but worse than when reference prices are accurate. These 
observations can be summarized:
Price Discovery Results.— Auction clearing prices tend to exceed the underlying 
security values in all treatments, with the greatest dispersion in the Grand Auction 
and the least dispersion in the accurate Reference Price Auction. Keeping reference 
prices secret before the auction does not improve price discovery.
To explain the somewhat surprising result that purchase efficiencies and price dis-
covery measures do not improve when reference prices are kept secret, we conduct 
in the next section an econometric analysis of individual bidding patterns.
IV. Econometric Analysis
The analysis in this section is based on behavioral patterns that emerge from a 
series of reduced-form panel regressions of the form:
(1)  Y i,t,s,k = α  X i,t,s,k +  μ i +  μ t + μ i,t +  u i,t,s,k ,
where  Y i,t,s,k and  X i,t,s,k are respectively the endogenous and explanatory variables (to be specified below), the subscript i = 1, … , 36 indexes subjects in a specific 
treatment, t = 1, … , 8 characterizes the auction number, s = 1, … , 6 is a security for 
sale at an auction, and k = 1, … , 5 captures the order (from lowest to highest) of the 
bids submitted by a bidder for a unit of a given security. So, k = 1 corresponds to 
the lowest bid submitted by a subject for a unit of a given security. The error term 
is  u i,t,s,k ,  μ i is an individual random effect,  μ t is an auction random effect and  μ i,t 
is an individual/auction random effect. Finally,  u i,t,s,k ,  μ i ,  μ t , and  μ i,t are assumed 
to be independent, mean zero and normally distributed with Var  ( u i,t,s,k ) =  σ u 2 , 
Var  ( μ i ) =  σ i 2 , Var  ( μ t ) =  σ t 2 , and Var  ( μ i,t ) =  σ i,t 2 .18
A. Bidding Behavior
Table 5 shows the estimation outcomes for the model in equation (1) when the 
dependent variable is the price bid by a subject for a unit of a given security.19 In all 
treatments, we find that, all else equal, subjects tend to submit higher bids when they 
receive a high signal (row 1) and for the last bids they submit for a given security 
18 Because the likelihood function cannot be expressed in closed form, the model is estimated by Maximum 
Simulated Likelihood and the estimates’ standard errors are evaluated by bootstrap. The results presented below are 
virtually identical when we include a session fixed effect.
19 Estimation results with significant parameters only are provided in the supplemental materials.
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(row 4). These results were expected. In particular, the second result simply reflects 
the fact that bids are ranked in ascending order.
We also identify different forms of learning across treatments. All else equal, sub-
jects in the Grand Auction tend to submit higher bids from one auction to the next 
(row 2). Likewise, subjects in Treatment 2 (Accurate Announced Reference Prices) 
learn to bid less aggressively.20 In contrast, subjects in Treatment 4 (Secret Noisy 
Reference Prices) lower their bids significantly over time. They seem to learn that 
they must become more aggressive for their bids to be accepted.
In all treatments, subjects tend to send lower bids when they have some market 
power for that security (i.e., when they own more contracts of that security), but the 
effect is in general insignificant (row 3). Interacting the bid number and the number 
20 Further analysis (not reported here) reveals that subjects in Treatment 2 learn to submit higher bids for high-
value securities (or equivalently, for securities with high reference prices).
Table 5— Econometric Analysis of Price Bid
Grand Auction
no reference prices
Accurate announced
reference prices
Noisy announced
reference prices
Noisy secret 
reference prices
1 Signal 0.907***
(0.011)
0.824***
(0.019)
0.737***
(0.021)
0.850***
(0.025)
2 Auction number 0.335***
(0.078)
0.427***
(0.109)
0.176
(0.145) −0.283***(0.072)
3 Number of
contracts owned
−0.448*
(0.276)
−0.198
(0.480)
−0.800
(0.573)
−0.329
(0.262)
4 Bid number 3.434***
(0.571)
5.469***
(1.033)
5.534***
(1.296)
6.070***
(0.584)
5 Bid number × 
number of contracts
−0.315**
(0.124)
−0.577**
(0.214)
−0.574**
(0.222)
−0.666***
(0.116)
6 Reference price — 5.826***
(0.542)
2.340***
(0.529) −0.151(0.245)
7 “Overpriced” 
reference price†
— — 1.702*
(0.893)
0.847
(0.576)
8 “Underpriced” 
reference price†
— — −6.294***
(1.807)
−0.191
(0.781)
9 Constant −2.188
(1.570)
−7.336**
(2.337)
3.980
(2.917)
1.282
(1.287)
10  σ u 5.215***(0.421)
6.226***
(0.688)
7.340***
(1.097)
6.641***
(0.720)
11  σ i 5.304***(0.126)
6.380***
(0.218)
8.750***
(0.246)
6.045***
(0.132)
12  σ t 4.084***(0.132)
3.865***
(0.183)
4.729***
(0.193)
3.865***
(0.134)
13  σ i, t 1.326***(0.412)
1.872***
(0.325)
3.816***
(0.658)
2.705***
(0.846)
14 log likelihood −8,829.7 −11,066.3 −11,398.0 −9,515.2
Notes: The models are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. Standard errors are evaluated by bootstrap.
† For security S, Overpriced (Underpriced) is set equal to | A | ×  i A>0 (| A | ×  i A<0 ), where A = Reference Pric e S − Valu e S /Valu e A . 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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of contracts owned yields negative and significant estimates (row 5), indicating that 
bidders who own more units of a security raise their prices from one unit of that 
security to the next at a slower pace.
We now turn to the specific influence (i.e., controlling for the bidder’s signal) of 
reference prices on bidding for the last three treatments with reference prices (row 6). 
When the reference prices are kept secret at the time of the auction (Treatment 4), 
we find no relationship between the bids submitted and the reference prices, as 
would be expected. In contrast, bids are positively correlated with announced refer-
ence prices, as hypothesized.
We can also evaluate how subjects adjust their bids in Treatments 3 and 4 in 
response to the errors the government makes when setting reference prices. To do 
so, we calculate the absolute deviation between the government’s noisy reference 
price ratio and the true ratio of values (i.e., the ratio of the security’s true value 
divided by the true value of security A). The variable “Overpriced Reference Price” 
(respectively “Underpriced Reference Price”) is then set equal to this absolute 
 deviation when the difference between the government’s reference price ratio and 
the true ratio of values is positive (respectively negative).
As expected, neither form of mispricing influences bids in Treatment 4 with secret 
reference prices (rows 7 and 8) since the bidders are unable to observe the bias in 
advance. In that respect, keeping reference prices secret does protect the govern-
ment against incorrect reference prices. In contrast, when noisy reference prices are 
announced (Treatment 3), we can see that, as expected, subjects take advantage of 
overpriced reference prices by bidding higher (row 7). The effect, however, is only 
significant at the 10 percent level, and its magnitude is not significantly greater than 
in the noisy secret Reference Price Auction.
Interestingly, our results suggest that subjects bid substantially more aggressively 
in Treatment 3 when the reference price is underpriced (row 8). In other words, it 
appears that bidders who own a security that has been underpriced realize that they 
are at a disadvantage, and they try to compensate by lowering their bids to remain 
competitive. Observing such behavior was somewhat surprising to us, as it not only 
reflects strategic sophistication on the part of our subjects, but also it was not antici-
pated when the Treasury team discussed the merits and potential drawbacks of the 
Reference Price Auction. This also demonstrates how useful lab experiments can be 
at testing the impact of public policies to be implemented in complex environments. 
To summarize:
Bidding Responses to Noisy Reference Prices.— Bids are responsive to announced 
reference prices and to perceived biases in government preannounced reference 
prices. Namely, subjects increase their bids slightly when reference prices are over-
priced, and lower their bids substantially when reference prices are underpriced. 
These two effects partially offset each other, which explains why keeping the refer-
ence prices secret does not improve the auction purchase efficiency. In other words, 
the unexpected absence of a significant difference between the last two treatments 
reflects the fact that the noisy announced reference price treatment performed above 
expectations, not that the noisy secret reference price treatment performed below 
expectations.
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B. Purchase Probabilities
Next we turn to selection issues, i.e., which securities tend to be purchased in 
the auctions. We consider a probit panel regression with a latent variable model 
of the form (1). The dependent variable is equal to one if a bid for a unit of a 
security is accepted, and zero otherwise. As indicated in Table 6, a bid is more 
likely to be accepted in each treatment (i) when the bidder’s private signal is 
below the security value (row 2), (ii) when the bidder owns more units of a secu-
rity (row 4), and (iii) for the first bids submitted for a given security, as these 
correspond (by construction) to lower bids (row 5). These results are consistent 
with intuition.
As expected, lower value securities are significantly more likely to be purchased 
in the Grand Auction (row 1). Although the magnitude is significantly lower, the 
same effect is found with secret noisy reference prices (Treatment 4). In contrast, 
the value of a security has no bearing on its probability of being purchased for 
Table 6 —Econometric Analysis of Bid Acceptance
Grand Auction
no reference prices
Accurate announced
reference prices
Noisy announced
reference prices
Noisy secret 
reference prices
1 Security value −0.089***
(0.009)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.006
(0.004)
−0.010**
(0.004)
2 Signal bias 
(i.e., signal – value) −0.082***(0.014)
−0.104***
(0.010)
−0.058***
(0.006)
−0.066***
(0.010)
3 Auction number 0.005
(0.014) −0.001(0.019)
−0.024
(0.015)
0.031
(0.016)
4 Number of  
contracts owned
0.242***
(0.055)
0.138***
(0.039)
0.137***
(0.037)
0.158***
(0.031)
5 Bid number −0.312***
(0.035)
−0.266***
(0.042)
−0.194***
(0.021)
−0.298***
(0.029)
6 Reference price — −0.013
(0.134)
−0.019
(0.021)
0.086
(0.107)
7 “Overpriced” 
reference price†
— — 0.426*
(0.204)
1.235***
(0.212)
8 “Underpriced” 
reference price†
— — −2.039***
(0.273)
−3.016***
(0.258)
9 Constant 0.536***
(0.071)
0.684**
(0.277)
0.515
(0.171)
0.606*
(0.212)
10  σ u 0.581***(0.087)
0.569***
(0.071)
0.523***
(0.080)
0.436***
(0.057)
11  σ i 0.417***(0.055)
0.512***
(0.050)
0.486***
(0.057)
0.461***
(0.039)
12  σ t 0.241***(0.052)
0.193***
(0.032)
0.197***
(0.042)
0.275***
(0.049)
14 log likelihood −881.2 −1,492.3 −1,562.1 −1,401.2
Notes: The models are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. Standard errors are evaluated by bootstrap.
†  For security S, Overpriced (Underpriced) is set equal to | A | ×  i A>0 (| A | ×  i A<0 ), where A = Reference Pric e S − Valu e S /Valu e A . 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Treatments 2 and 3 in which reference prices are announced in advance. In other 
words, the use of  reference prices appears to be effective in homogenizing  securities 
of different values, but it is not fully effective when reference prices are only 
announced ex post.
In all treatments with reference prices (Treatments 2, 3, and 4), the probability 
of a security being purchased is (all else equal) unrelated to its reference price 
(row 6). In both treatments with noisy reference prices, however, a bid is more 
likely to be accepted when a reference price is overpriced (row 7) and less likely 
to be accepted when it is underpriced (row 8). When the reference prices are kept 
secret (Treatment 4), this result only reflects the mechanics of the allocation pro-
cess. Indeed, since behavior is the same regardless of the reference pricing errors, 
bids are automatically more likely to be accepted when a reference price is over-
priced. When noisy reference prices are announced in advance, we saw from the 
estimated bid functions in Table 5 that bidders do indeed adjust their bids in reac-
tion to biases in reference prices. The results obtained in Table 6 for Treatment 3 
therefore reflect both a mechanical and a strategic effect. In particular, observe in 
rows 7 and 8 that the magnitude of the effects of the two forms of mispricing is 
significantly lower when reference prices are announced in advance (Treatment 3) 
instead of being kept secret (Treatment 4).21 Perhaps surprisingly, having noisy 
reference prices has a greater influence on which securities are purchased when 
reference prices are secret.
Purchase Probability Results.— In the Grand Auction, the government tends 
to purchase securities of low value. When reference prices are announced, the 
purchase probabilities are largely uncorrelated with security values. When refer-
ence prices are noisy, announcing them before the auction helps soften (but not 
increase as hypothesized) the impact of mispricing on the values of securities that 
are purchased.
C. Government Losses on Securities Purchased
Finally, we examine the characteristics of the securities on which the government 
loses money. To do so, we estimate panel regressions of the form (1) in which the 
dependent variable is the government losses on each accepted bid, i.e., the security’s 
actual value minus the security’s purchased price. 22
It is apparent from the estimates reported in Table 7 that, in all treatments, the 
government loses more money (i) on low-value securities (row 1), (ii) when the 
bidder overestimates the security’s value (row 2), and (iii) on the last bids sub-
mitted by a bidder for a given security (row 5). In particular, observe in row 2 
21 All else equal, incorrectly setting a security’s reference price at 1.5 (respectively 0.5) instead of 1 increases 
(respectively reduces) the security’s chances of being purchased in the noisy announced reference price treatment 
by 10 percent (respectively 30 percent). When reference prices are not announced, the analogous increase and 
decrease percentages are larger, at 25 percent and 51 percent.
22 The government losses are closely related to the purchase efficiency measures discussed earlier. Indeed, since 
this is a zero-sum game, the government loses money at an auction when the purchase efficiency is below one. In 
what follows, our focus is the government losses on a security-by-security basis, not at the auction level.
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that, as expected, the extent of the first effect is significantly larger in the Grand 
Auction where bidders are more likely to sell low-value securities. Note also that 
 government losses in the Grand Auction tend to increase from one auction to the 
next (row 3). This result is a direct consequence of the increase in the submitted 
bids observed previously in Table 5.
Next, consider the effects of using reference prices. When reference prices 
are announced (Treatments 2 and 3), the government’s losses increase with the 
reference price (row 6), holding constant other factors such as the value of the 
security. This observation reflects the fact that subjects tend to bid higher in this 
situation. Finally, as one would expect, the government loses more when refer-
ence prices are overpriced (row 7) and less when reference prices are underpriced 
(row 8). Note that, although the magnitudes of both of these effects are larger in 
Treatment 3 than in Treatment 4 (i.e., when noisy reference prices are announced 
Table 7— Econometric Analysis of Government Losses
Grand Auction
no reference prices
Accurate announced
reference prices
Noisy announced
reference prices
Noisy secret 
reference prices
1 Security value 0.892***
(0.022)
0.153***
(0.017)
0.208***
(0.040)
0.157***
(0.032)
2 Signal bias 
(i.e., signal – value) −0.073**(0.028)
−0.134***
(0.030)
−0.213***
(0.064)
−0.236***
(0.045)
3 Auction number −0.275**
(0.119)
0.163
(0.096)
0.262
(0.296)
0.171
(0.194)
4 Number of  
contracts owned
0.113
(0.088)
0.153**
(0.069)
0.003
(0.179)
0.395
(0.279)
5 Bid number −0.109**
(0.031)
−0.070
(0.055)
−0.187**
(0.078)
−0.246*
(0.127)
6 Reference price — −6.824***
(0.446)
−4.219***
(0.768)
−0.486
(0.600)
7 “Overpriced” 
reference price†
— — −4.677***
(1.226)
−2.780***
(1.511)
8 “Underpriced” 
reference price†
— — 32.435***
(3.299)
31.743***
(3.452)
9 Constant −39.158***
(1.428)
−0.509
(0.922)
−9.902***
(1.867)
−12.201***
(1.367)
10  σ u 2.150***(0.086)
1.200***
(0.153)
2.840***
(0.228)
1.823***
(0.306)
11  σ i 2.048***(0.174)
1.823***
(0.241)
6.775***
(0.336)
5.822***
(0.351)
12  σ t 1.589***(0.208)
1.317***
(0.187)
1.826***
(0.240)
1.925***
(0.240)
14  σ i, t 0.889***(0.276)
0.831***
(0.275)
1.166***
(0.285)
0.962***
(0.343)
15 log likelihood −4,589.0 −4,492.3 −5,571.0 −5,418.4
Notes: The models are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. Standard errors are evaluated by bootstrap.
†  For security S, Overpriced (Underpriced) is set equal to | A | ×  i A>0 (| A | ×  i A<0 ), where A 
= Reference Pric e S − Valu e S /Valu e A . 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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rather than kept secret), the difference between the treatments is not significant. 
To sum up:
Government Loss Results.— In the Grand Auction, the government loses money 
on low-value securities it purchases. As predicted, this is much less the case in all 
three Reference Price Auctions. The impact of incorrectly set reference prices on 
the government’s losses is not significantly affected by whether or not these noisy 
reference prices are announced or kept secret before the auction.
V. Conclusion
The Reference Price Auction the Treasury had chosen to purchase illiquid 
mortgage-backed securities performed well in our experiment. In particular, it 
 systematically outperformed a Grand Auction even when the reference prices were 
set with considerable noise and announced before the auction. In other words, we 
find that, by homogenizing bids for items of different values, a Reference Price 
Auction can effectively promote competition and mitigate adverse selection. Beyond 
the TARP auction, these results are relevant to the various multi-object auctions 
cited in the introduction in which value heterogeneity and informational asymme-
tries often pose serious efficiency challenges.
These findings illustrate how experimental economics may be a useful comple-
ment to economic theory when designing public policy in complex environments 
or under considerable time pressure. In particular, although the economists and 
 auction designers involved in the project correctly predicted the negative impact of 
announced overpriced reference prices, they did not anticipate the counterbalancing 
effect generated by owners of securities with underpriced reference prices. In other 
words, the experiment revealed that a design with noisy announced reference prices 
would perform better than expected.
More generally, our results provide some support to the auction designers (e.g., 
Klemperer 2002) who have argued that beyond optimality considerations, the per-
formance of an auction is mostly driven in practice by basic economics forces. In 
this case, the relative success of the Reference Price Auction may be explained in 
large part by the fact that it promotes competition by letting owners of different 
securities bid against each other on a relatively leveled playing field.
REFERENCES
Armantier, Olivier. 1999. “Three Essays on the Empirical Application of Game Theoretic Models.” 
PhD diss. University of Pittsburgh. 
Armantier, Olivier, Jean-Pierre Florens, and Jean-Françios Richard. 1998. “Équilibre approximatif et 
règle intuitive: une application aux appels d’offres dans l’industrie spatiale.” Economie et Previ-
sion 132 (1): 179–90. 
Armantier, Olivier, Charles A. Holt, and Charles R. Plott. 2013. “A Procurement Auction for Toxic 
Assets with Asymmetric Information: Dataset.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.4.142.
Asker, John, and Estelle Cantillon. 2008. “Properties of scoring auctions.” RAND Journal of Econom-
ics 39 (1): 69–85.
Ausubel, Lawrence M., and Peter Cramton. 2008. “Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan.” Econo-
mists’  Voice 5 (5): Article 5.
162 AMERicAN EcoNoMic JouRNAL: MicRoEcoNoMicS NoVEMBER 2013
Binmore, Ken, and Paul Klemperer. 2002. “The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Tele-
com Licenses.” Economic Journal 112 (478): C74–96.
Brusco, Sandro. 2008. “What is a reverse auction?” Vox, October 21. http://www.voxeu.org/article/
paulson-plan-what-reverse-auction.
Cason, Timothy N., Lata Gangadharan, and Charlotte Duke. 2003. “A laboratory study of auctions 
for reducing non-point source pollution.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
46 (3): 446–71.
Cummings, Ronald G., Charles A. Holt, and Susan K. Laury. 2004. “Using laboratory experiments for 
policy making: An example from the Georgia irrigation reduction auction.” Journal of Policy Anal-
ysis and Management 23 (2): 341–63.
Goeree, Jacob K., and Charlie A. Holt. 2008. “Standardized Uniform-Price Reverse Auctions A Multi-
Market Auction Approach for the Treasury’s Rescue Plan.” Unpublished.
Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt. 2010. “Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combi-
natorial auction.” Games and Economic Behavior 70 (1): 146–69.
Hasbrouck, Joel. 2007. Empirical Market Microstructure. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Holt, Charles, William Shobe, Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer, and Jacob Goeree. 2008. Auction Design 
for Selling co2 Emissions Allowances under the Regional Greenhouse Gas initiative. New York 
State Energy Research Development Authority (NYSERDA). Albany, October. 
Holt, Charles A., William M. Shobe, and Angela K. Smith. 2007. “An Experimental Basis for Pub-
lic Policy Initiatives.” In Promoting the General Welfare: New Perspectives on Government Per-
formance, edited by Alan S. Gerber and Eric M. Patashnik, 174–99. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press.
Klemperer, Paul. 2002. “What Really Matters in Auction Design.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
16 (1): 169–89.
Klemperer, Paul. 2010. “The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods.” 
Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2–3): 526–36.
Plott, Charlie. 2001. Public Economics, Political Processes and Policy Applications: collected Papers 
on the Experimental Foundations of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 1. Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar.
Plott, Charlie. 2008. “Proposal for Structuring the Auction of Distressed Mortgage Securities.” Unpub-
lished.
Stoneham, Gary, Vivek Chundhri, Arthur Ha, and Loris Strappazzon. 2002. “Victoria’s Bush Tender 
Trial: A Cost Sharing Approach to Biodiversity.” Unpublished.
Swagel, Philip. 2009. “The Financial Crisis: An Inside View.” Brookings Paper on Economic Activity 
39 (1): 1–63.
Varian, Hal R. 2008. “How to Drink the Sub-Prime Kool-Aid.” Economists’ Voice 5 (5): Article 13.
